Bartender Summary                                                                                      

• Bartender 1: A Xxxxx Xxxxx in her late Xxx, x’xx”, with an average build. She had xxx hair with xxxx worn in a xxxxx. She wore xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxx xx. The agent’s receipt stated her name to be Xxxxx.

At the time when the agent entered the bar there were plenty of seats available. He found a seat at the bar and began waiting for service. At the time that the agent entered, Xxxxx was taking a take-out order from a guest at the bar. It appeared that she was very unfamiliar with the POS system as this took a very long time. Also during this time four more guests entered the bar, two at a booth and two more at the bar itself.

Instead of acknowledging any of the guests who had just entered Xxxxx chose to make drinks for tickets that had printed out. At this time the bartender was visibly flustered between making drinks and serving guests. After waiting over five minutes with no eye contact the agent was finally acknowledged by Xxxxx. Management should instruct Xxxxx acknowledge new customers and in the very least, give them some sort of eye contact. A 1.5 second eye contact and simple nod tells the customer that they know that the employee knows they are there and will get to them. Being outright ignored while the bartender fields drink tickets is borderline maddening.

Xxxxx asked what the agent would like to drink and for identification after the agent stated his order. Xxxxx quickly presented the drink with a beverage napkin and moved on to the other guests.

She did not offer chips/salsa or a menu.

Xxxxx repeated this pattern of service with the other patrons in the bar. She was sure to enter each drink into the POS as she made it. This slowed her down considerable due to her unfamiliarity with the system. After getting drinks for the patrons in the bar Xxxxx left the bar area.

Throughout the agent’s visit Xxxxx would leave the bar unattended for long extended periods of time. On two instances she returned with take-out orders, but even then the agent felt the large amount of time spent away from the bar was unjustified. Most of the times Xxxxx left the bar there were guests that needed drinks or refills.

Towards the end of the agent’s visit he sat with an empty drink for almost ten minutes while the bartender said she was, “Going to get a Coke.”

After almost ten minutes of sitting without any further acknowledgement the agent took it upon himself to ask for a menu. Xxxxx provided the menu promptly and at this point also realized she had failed to offer anybody chips and salsa. She quickly beckoned another employee named Xxxxx and stated that she needed chips and salsa for everybody in the bar. Once again, nearly ten minutes after the agent had seated himself.

Soon thereafter chips and salsa were provided to the agent and each other guest in the bar. Unfortunately the chips and salsa were not accompanied with napkins or silverware of any sort.

The agent decided which item from the menu he wanted and closed his menu as a non-verbal gesture that he was ready to order.  He made eye contact with Xxxxx several times hoping she would come over and take the agent’s order; she did not. The agent waited another ten minutes while the bartender left from behind the bar and chatted with other employees about personal matters in a loud manner.

Once again, the agent took it upon himself to ask if he could order some food. The bartender then moved to the POS and turned back to the agent waiting for his order, rather than coming to the agent to have a more personal approach. That was an astonishing breech of service etiquette…I couldn’t believe it actually was happened. The agent ordered his meal, which it appeared Xxxxx did not how to find in the POS system. Another employee was present at the well, whom Xxxxx asked where to find the dish.

Xxxxx did not offer any up-sells or suggest an appetizer. She in fact closed the window before asking if the agent wanted to order anything else; he did, which he then communicated to her and she returned to the POS to input it.

The agent overheard Xxxxx speaking with another patron in the bar explaining her history with the establishment. She mentioned that she had worked there 12 years before and had just recently returned. The agent took this conversation as an explanation as to why she was unfamiliar with the POS and as to why she was so easily flustered.

The agent’s dish was delivered shortly thereafter by his bartender. She had yet to drop off napkins and silverware but quickly did so thereafter. Xxxxx asked the agent if he needed anything.

The agent requested a side item for the meal at this time. She never ever, brought it out.

There was no check-back performed during the meal.

The agent’s drink level ran low for the majority of his visit. He would have been inclined to have more drinks than he did but quite frankly, he did not have that much time to spare in between beverages.

Eventually the agent was able to order another beverage after he asked the bartender for one. Xxxxx asked if the agent would like a lime wedge with his drink. The agent was forced to decline to the fact that he had previously seen Xxxxx handle the fruit garnishes with her bare hands, and prior to that had seen her cough directly into her hands several times without washing them (AZ Health Code Violation). Not only is this a health code violation, but it’s really gross. If Agent was not on duty, most certainly would have tabbed out, left, and never returned to this establishment.

At the conclusion of the agent’s meal his dishes as many others at the bar sat unbussed for some time.

When Xxxxx finally removed the dishes she offered the agent dessert or additional drinks. The agent declined the dessert offer but mentioned that he may stay to have more drinks.

At this time the agent could have actually used another drink, unfortunately this was the time Xxxxx departed to get a Coke as previously mentioned. Once she returned the agent had been holding an empty drink for quite some time. Even then Xxxxx did not immediately offer another beverage.

The agent had an itemized receipt placed in front of him throughout his visit. Xxxxx would update this receipt with each new item the agent ordered. The agent reviewed his tab before presenting payment. He then presented payment in form of a credit card which sat on the bar top for five minutes before it was processed.

Xxxxx grabbed the card and the agent’s itemized tab. She then took the itemized receipt and threw it into the trash and ran the credit card. She returned the credit card with two copies of the receipt. Oddly though, the total the agent was charged was significantly lower than what it should have been.

The agent suspects Xxxxx removed all drinks from the tab in an effort to garner a higher tip. Theft Occurrence here is highly suspected; however, the agent was not able to question the total due to Xxxxx once again not being available.

Michael Zenner - CEO  
         
Eye Spy Spotter Services Inc.
eyespyspotter.com
bartheft.com  (blog)
Hospitality Checkpoint PLLC
Lic. 1597616
hospitalitycheckpoint.com
liquorassessment.com
PO BOX 995 Gilbert AZ 85299
Office: 480-777-7056
Mobile: 602-622-0875
Toll Free: 800-880-0811

Bartender Summary

1. Bartender 1:  Xxxxxx, 6’3”, Xxxxxxxx, in his early twenties, with very short hair or a shaved head, wearing a black cap.  He wore a greenish-brown tee shirt and jeans and had tattoos up both arms.
2. Bartender 2:  Xxxxxx, 5’9”, Xxxxxxxx, in his early twenties, lean build, with very short hair, wearing a backwards cap.  He wore a black tee shirt and jeans.
3. Bartender 3:  Xxxxxx, 5’10”, Xxxxxxxx, in his early twenties, medium athletic build, with short hair or a shaved head, wearing a black backwards cap.  He wore a gray tee shirt, jeans, and a leather bracelet and had tattoos up his left arm.
4. Bartender 4:  Xxxxxx, 5’9”, Xxxxxxxx, in his early twenties, with short dark hair and a goatee.  He wore a red tee shirt and jeans.
5. Bartender 5:  Xxxxxx, 6’2”, Xxxxxxxx, in his early twenties, with short dark hair and a goatee.  He wore a black polo shirt and jeans.
6. Barback:  Xxxxxx, 5’6”, Xxxxxxxx, in his early twenties, thin build, with short dark hair, wearing a black backwards cap.  He wore a gray tee shirt and jeans.

Bartender 1 approached within thirty seconds of sitting at the bar.  He asked what the agent would like to drink.  The agent ordered drinks, and Bartender 1 had an opportunity to ask for a liquor preference, but did not.  Bartender 1 placed napkins on the bar, went to pour the drinks, and served them.  Bartender 1 did not ask for identification; the agent appears to be in his late twenties or early thirties.  He asked if the agent would like to start a tab, collected the credit card, recorded the order and placed a playing card on the bar in front of the agent saying, “This is for you.”  A couple minutes later, Bartender 1 quickly asked, as a side note, if the agent would like a menu.  The agent declined.

When the agent’s drink was a little more than one-third full, Bartender 1 asked if the agent would like another drink.  The agent declined.  Later when the drink was completely empty, Bartender 1 asked again.  The agent asked about the drinks on the menu.  Bartender brought the flip cards and pointed out the specialty drink menu.  Agent ordered a drink.  Bartender 1 asked Bartender 2 if they had a certain ingredient before preparing the drink.  Bartender 1 informed the agent that they were out of one of the ingredients, but did not offer an alternative.  The agent ordered a different drink.  Bartender 1 immediately prepared and served this drink.  He recorded the drink in the register.

Bartender 1 was polite but only somewhat attentive.  At times he was seen checking diligently on patrons, and at times he was very inattentive to the customers while he was distracted by other employees or certain customers who looked to be friends.  Bartender 1 was polite to all customers, but only friendly to a few.  His friendliness appeared to correlate with the amount of drinks ordered and/or his relationship with the customer, i.e. whether the customer was a friend, a regular or someone new.  He was very friendly when speaking to two patrons about the incentives they would get when purchasing gift cards.  He specifically talked to them about the times he would be working so they could buy the gift cards from him.

Bartender 1 was seen mixing a drink in the blender.  At approximately 8:13 PM, he poured some or all of it into a solo cup and placed it on the bar away from any patrons.  The cup stayed on the bar for at least twenty or thirty minutes, seemingly untouched, before it suddenly disappeared.  The agent does not know what happened to it, or who/what it was for.

Bartender 1 was heard asking whether two patrons wanted a refill of their wine.  When they declined, he asked “What if I buy them?”  Then he told them to let him know when they were ready for the refills at around 8:27 PM.  The agent wonders whether his offer had anything to do with the bottle of wine almost being empty.  About a minute later, Bartender 1 opened another bottle and poured the offered drinks.  The agent did not see Bartender 1 record the drinks anywhere.

At around 8:40 PM, a patron, whom Bartender 1 referred to as “Xxxxxx,” approached the bar.  Bartender 1 served Xxxxxx a bottle of beer and a dark liquid shot.  After a few minutes Bartender 1 appeared to enter these drinks into the register for a tab located in the very top row of the playing card slots on the wall.  Bartender 2 was seen chatting with Xxxxxx a few times, as well.

Bartender 1 became especially inattentive to the agent later towards the end of the visit, and passed by several times without checking in.  The agent tried to catch his eye to cash out, but could not.

Bartender 1 was seen drinking out of a capped solo cup most of the time; however, he was also seen drinking a dark liquid out of a bottle from the opposite side of the bar once around 9:02 PM.  The agent believes this bottle was capped and placed either under the bar or in an ice bucket after Bartender 1 drank from it.  It was unclear what type of drink was in the bottle; however, it would be easy to use it for an alcoholic beverage.

Bartender 1 was also seen throwing various items at the wait staff, other bartenders and the barback to engage in horseplay at different times throughout the evening.

Bartender 2 asked the agent if he would like another drink a couple times.  He commented positively on the agent’s drink choice, the one time he filled a drink order.  He also checked back on the drink after a few minutes to ask how it tasted.  Bartender 2 was attentive when he was present on the agent’s side of the bar.  He was also consistently attentive and friendly with all customers.

Bartender 2 was seen checking a cell phone, one that resembled a Blackberry that was placed between the two registers on the west side of the bar.  He did not pick it up, but checked it once after the agent heard a message-like beep, and again a couple times later.  The agent knew he had checked the phone because the screen was lit up after he passed the registers.  Bartender 2 was also seen placing an open beer bottle under the bar; the agent saw the beer become frothy after opening it, so the beer was unsuitable to serve.

Bartender 3 was working the outside bar, but came in a few times to pour draft beer.  He was always in a hurry and never spent more than a couple minutes inside.  At approximately 8:14 PM Bartender 3 was pouring a beer while he took a shot of dark liquid out of a translucent plastic throw-away cup.  It was unclear whether this was liquor; however, it seemed unlikely, due to the color and consistency of the liquid, that it was soda.

ADLLC Violation
TITLE 4, CHAPTER 3
4-244. Unlawful acts
12. For a licensee, when engaged in waiting on or serving customers, to consume spirituous liquor or for a licensee or on-duty employee to be on or about the licensed premises while in an intoxicated or disorderly condition.

Bartender 4 began working behind the bar ten to fifteen minutes before the agent left for the night.  Bartender 4 appeared to get settled and jump right in asking if patrons needed anything.  He asked if the agent needed another drink a couple times when he passed.  On Bartender 4’s second pass, he closed out the agent’s tab when asked.  He asked whether the agent wanted to use the credit card that was securing the tab.  The tab was itemized and quickly presented.  Bartender 4 was very accommodating and pleasant.

Bartender 5 began working the bar just after Bartender 4 did.  He also settled in quickly and started making the rounds.  He asked the agent once for another drink order.  He was seen interacting with the guests pleasantly and appeared to be friendly.

Barback was seen hustling in and out of the bar area restocking glasses.  At times he joked with other employees, but in a rather loud and sometimes obnoxious way.  He was also seen drinking from a Red Bull can twice, once at approximately 7:52 PM and another time around 8:29 PM, both times from behind the bar.  He was very industrious, performing his duties efficiently.

Overall the bartenders ran the bar efficiently and followed proper procedures and recorded all drinks after serving them with two exceptions noted: the earlier mentioned free wines; and a manager, subsequently referred to as Manager 2, verbally called out an order at approximately 8:18 PM.  The agent did not notice a ticket or any movement to record this order by Bartender 1.

The bartenders pulled tickets and filled those orders almost immediately.  The bartenders poured consistent 4 count, 1 ½ ounce drinks.  Cash transactions appeared to be handled properly, and credit cards were secured for all other transactions.  Unless noted previously, staff drank from capped Solo cups.

The bartenders were friendly, overall, though Bartender 1 seemed to be more friendly and chatty with some patrons than others.  They worked the bar area fairly well together, again with Bartender 1 losing interest at times.  The barback and bartenders also seemed to forget they were working at times and became engaged in their own conversations and horseplay.

Michael Zenner - CEO  
         
Eye Spy Spotter Services Inc.
eyespyspotter.com
bartheft.com  (blog)
Hospitality Checkpoint PLLC
Lic. 1597616
hospitalitycheckpoint.com
liquorassessment.com
PO BOX 995 Gilbert AZ 85299
Office: 480-777-7056
Mobile: 602-622-0875
Toll Free: 800-880-0811

Exotic Embezzling: Investigating Off-Book Fraud Schemes

By Thomas Buckhoff and James Clifton

For obvious reasons, cash is the asset most often stolen by dishonest employees. Fraudsters typically target cash as it enters or leaves the business. Thoroughly understanding the controls and procedures in place for processing cash flowing through a business is of primary importance when conducting a fraud examination. Inadequate cash flow controls, especially over substantial amounts, allow dishonest employees to divert cash into their own pockets. Understanding these controls allows investigators to generate ideas, known as fraud theories, that describe how someone could steal cash from the organization without getting caught. These ideas can be categorized as either on-book or off-book fraud schemes.

Historically, law enforcement and financial investigators are reluctant to investigate off-book fraud schemes due to their lack of direct, documentary evidence. The case study below illustrates various methods effectively used to detect and investigate off-book fraud schemes. Such indirect methods include financial statement analysis, undercover surveillance, invigilation, and admission-seeking interviews.

On-Book and Off-Book Fraud Schemes

Cash larceny involves the theft of cash after it has appeared on a company’s books. Such schemes are called on-book frauds because an examination of the victim company’s records can easily reveal the cash shortage. Here, the company typically knows that a theft has occurred. On-book frauds can be categorized as billing, payroll, expense reimbursement, check tampering, or register disbursement schemes.

Skimming is an example of an off-book fraud, which involves theft of incoming cash before it enters the accounting records. Thus, no record of the fraud exists on the company’s books. Skimming typically entails selling goods or services to a customer, collecting the customer’s cash payment, and making no record of the sale. The victim generally does not know that a theft has occurred. Off-book frauds cannot be detected by examining the company’s books and records and generally are categorized as skimming, unrecorded sales, understated sales and receivables, or theft of checks through the mail.

Case Study: Northern Exposure

Northern Exposure (all names in this case study have been changed) was a gentleman’s club featuring exotic dancers. Its primary revenue sources were cover charges and food, beer, and liquor sales. A recent local ordinance outlawed the type of entertainment offered by Northern Exposure. The club’s manager, however, successfully petitioned the city council to obtain an exemption, and Northern Exposure was allowed to continue operations in a competition-free environment. The substantial effort by the manager on the club’s behalf earned her the owner’s trust and loyalty. In the initial fraud investigation interview, the owner said that anyone could be a suspect—except the manager.

Because of the exemption, the club’s profit potential was enormous. Northern Exposure generated huge amounts of incoming cash, because no credit cards or checks were accepted. However, a huge risk existed that employees would figure out a way to divert incoming cash into their own pockets.

Larry Swenson, Northern Exposure’s owner, was not satisfied with the 10% margins being realized. He engaged two certified fraud examiners to determine why the club was not generating the 35% margins he had expected. They embarked upon a typical fraud examination, whose steps include understanding cash controls, generating fraud theories, collecting and evaluating evidence, estimating losses, assisting in filing claims or bringing charges, and making recommendations.

Understanding Cash Flows

By interviewing Swenson and other personnel, the fraud investigators learned that cash flowed into the business as follows:
Customers paid a $6 cover charge to enter the club. No receipt was given, nor was a head count made. Customers placed orders for food or beverages with the servers. The servers started out with $40 in a cash pouch. They paid the bartenders for their orders from this, then collected payment from the customer. At their shift’s end, the server gave the initial $40 back to the manager and kept the difference as tips. At the end of the night, the manager counted the cash and closed out the cash registers; the cash was deposited by the manager the next morning. Changes in beer and liquor inventory were not reconciled to the drinks rung into the cash register, nor were the register tapes reconciled to deposits listed on the bank statements.

Generating Fraud Theories

The fraud examiners determined that it would be relatively easy for employees to steal and not be caught, based on the control levels they discovered. They developed the following fraud theories:

• Employees collecting the $6 cover charge could pocket some of the money or allow free admission to friends.
• Servers and bartenders could get drinks for customers, not ring them into the registers, and pocket the cash received from the customers.
• Anyone with access to the cash registers (i.e., servers, bartenders, and the manager) could simply take cash directly from the registers.
• The manager could perpetrate any of the schemes available to the employees, and could steal part of the deposit.

Off-book frauds such as the first two theories are called skimming and are essentially unrecorded sales. The second two would be considered on-book frauds. Because there was a transaction record, the fraud could be detected by reconciling the cash register tapes to the deposits. In Northern Exposure’s case, however, cash register printing ribbons were not replaced on a timely basis, resulting in illegible tapes.

Collecting and Evaluating Evidence

Indirect investigative methods were used to test the fraud theories. Financial statement analysis is one such method that can be used to test all four fraud theories presented. If employees are indeed stealing cash from the club, then the actual sales markup-over-cost ratios are expected to be less than the budgeted ratios. Accordingly, the fraud investigators determined the actual markup-cost ratios for beer and food sales. Beer was purchased for $.60 per bottle, then sold to customers for $3 each, a markup of 500%. Food items costing $5 were sold to customers for $12.50, a 250% markup. One year’s budgeted revenue was calculated, based on cost of sales and expected markup ratios, then compared to one year’s actual revenue (see Exhibit 1). The significant differences in ratios clearly supported the fraud theories—in fact, food sales were less than their cost of sales! Using this indirect investigative method, the total estimated annual fraud loss due to skimming or cash larceny was $379,974.

The investigators knew that the club had a big problem with fraud; determining which employees were responsible came next. Undercover surveillance can be used effectively for identifying dishonest employees. Posing as customers, a team of six trained fraud investigators (with experience as bartenders and servers) spent a collective 40-hour week at the club observing the employees’ activities and behavior. This surveillance revealed that 90% of them, including the manager, regularly stole cash from the club, with little regard to subtlety. The reason that employees never complained about salary levels, despite low base wages and a lack of raises, became clear. In fact, several servers and bartenders had been there for years, which is highly unusual for this type of club. The lead investigators communicated their findings to Swenson, who, though concerned, was reluctant to take action without more substantive evidence of employee theft.

Estimating Losses Incurred

To more firmly establish the fraud losses and estimate their amount, the fraud investigators conduced a week-long invigilation. Invigilation creates a strict internal control environment so that opportunities to commit fraud are virtually eliminated and a fraud-free profile can be established. The cash received and deposited during the invigilation is then compared to the periods before and after. As an indirect investigative method, invigilation can be very effective in estimating fraud losses. The key to an invigilation’s success is making the employees think that any theft during that period will be detected. Instilling the perception of detection in this case was accomplished by sending in the same team of six investigators to watch the employees for one week. The club’s employees and manager were informed that the investigators were there to make sure that every dollar collected from customers made it into the bank at the end of the day and that changes in consumable inventories were properly accounted for. During the invigilation, the investigators conspicuously watched employees handling cash, conducted surprise cash counts, reconciled changes in inventory to cash register tapes, monitored end-of-night cash counts, and witnessed the daily cash deposits.

The first day brought an incident that greatly heightened the perception of detection. Meals were served downstairs, away from the live entertainment area. Suspecting the single server working downstairs of skimming money from food sales, one of the investigators conducted a surprise cash count and reconciled cash rung into the register to meals prepared by the cooks. The server had skimmed $25 in the first hour she worked. When confronted with the evidence, the server confessed and was immediately terminated. News quickly spread to the other employees, who realized that their activities were indeed under close surveillance. No other employees were caught skimming during the remainder of the invigilation.

During the invigilation’s first night, a Friday, $8,300 in cash was deposited into the bank—the largest sum for one night in the entire 15-year history of the club. This occurred on what was considered a “slow” night—unlike the previous week, which had seen near-record attendance. The manager and employees all soon realized that setting such a record on a slow night reflected poorly on them. This convinced Swenson that his employees were stealing from him, and he wanted to fire everyone on the spot. The investigators persuaded him to allow the invigilation to continue for the entire week as planned. The results of the week-long invigilation are summarized as follows:

Gross cash receipts during the invigilation were $30,960, compared with $25,775 the previous week and $22,006 for the annual weekly average (see Exhibit 2). The revenue during the week of invigilation exceeded the average weekly revenue by $8,954 and the previous week’s revenue by $5,185, despite being a slow week. The above differences implied that at least $259,250 and as much as $447,700 was skimmed per year. (After changes were implemented following the investigation, the remaining nine months’ sales were $300,000 higher than for the same period in the prior year.)

Swenson no longer doubted that his employees were stealing from him. As noted earlier, Swenson had had difficulty believing his manager was stealing because of her efforts to exempt the club from the city ordinance. It became apparent that these efforts were motivated by a desire to protect her illicit cash flow.

Employee interviews were held during the week of the invigilation. Their purpose was twofold: to further enhance the perception of detection during the invigilation period, and to provide employees with an opportunity to report any fraudulent activities. Very specific questions were asked during the interviews, based upon information from the prior undercover surveillance and the ongoing invigilation. While no one admitted to stealing, they did implicate fellow employees; many claimed that manager Betsy Smith was the primary thief.

Filing Claims and Pressing Charges

During her interview, Betsy Smith was confronted with the evidence from the undercover surveillance, invigilation, and employee interviews. After 2 Qs hours, she admitted to stealing almost $100,000 over three years. Her admission was converted to a written statement, which she ultimately signed. The statement detailed the amounts she had skimmed, when she had done so, and the various techniques (skimming from liquor sales, bank deposits, video sales, and food deliveries) she had used. An attached summary totaled the funds skimmed by source. Since evidence collected in resolving off-book fraud schemes is mostly indirect and circumstantial, obtaining a signed admission statement greatly facilitates the filing of employee dishonesty insurance claims or criminal charges. In this case, such a claim was filed by the fraud investigators on behalf of Northern Exposure.

The insurance company restituted Northern Exposure for the maximum coverage amount provided by their policy, $50,000. Clearly, the coverage amount was inadequate given the exposure to risk for such a cash-intensive business. As required by the insurance provider, evidence collected during the fraud examination was turned over to local law enforcement for prosecution.

Making Fraud Prevention Recommendations

Cash-intensive businesses (e.g., bars, restaurants, casinos, convenience stores, movie theaters) are vulnerable to off-book fraud schemes. Few people will steal if they think they will be caught and suffer serious negative consequences. Accordingly, the most effective deterrent is to instill this perception of detection in employees’ minds. In Northern Exposure’s case, the two assets most susceptible to theft were cash and inventory, especially the beer and liquor inventories. Consequently, better internal controls were needed to safeguard those assets.

The following internal controls were implemented:

• Liquor and beer inventory access was restricted to one person, the head bartender, establishing responsibility for inventory shortages.
• A meticulous physical inventory was taken, with liquor bottles weighed both before and after each night’s shift. The change in inventory was reconciled with the cash register receipts, providing an independent check on how much cash should be deposited for any given night.
• Cash registers were closed out by the night manager, who had no access to the registers during the shift. The cash deposits were also made by the same individual. The next day the general manager would reconcile copies of the cash registers tapes to the deposit slips. The general manager also performed bank-to-book reconciliations at the end of the month.
• Financial statements were analyzed monthly to determine if the markup-cost ratios were consistent with pricing policies.
• Employees were encouraged to call a fraud hotline if they had knowledge of fraudulent activity being perpetrated by any of the employees. Such tipsters, if their information proved accurate, were rewarded with a cash bonus.
• Surveillance cameras were installed directly over each cash register to ensure that the cashiers rang up sales correctly. Employees immediately tested the cameras with pranks and found that security personnel were indeed watching. (Northern Exposure spent $25,000 on surveillance equipment, which was recovered in less than one month through the prevention of skimming.) This strengthened the perception of detection and deterred two common ways bartenders steal: leaving the cash drawer open between sales, and hitting “No Sale” or “Void” on the register to open the cash drawer. In both cases, since no sale record is made on the cash register tape, the bartender can pocket the money from such sales. Ideally, the cash register tape should capture No Sales and Voids and bartenders should have to explain them at the end of their shift.
• To further enhance the perception of detection, employees were informed that the following would be conducted on a surprise basis during the month: 1) undercover surveillance, 2) inventory and cash-register audits, 3) review of disbursements and supporting documentation, and 4) employee fraud assessment interviews.

Companies will always be susceptible to fraud at the points where cash enters or leaves the business. But even cash-intensive businesses can take measures to ensure that fraud is minimized or eradicated. Despite a lack of direct evidence, off-book fraud schemes, such as the skimming that occurred at Northern Exposure, can be detected and thwarted through indirect investigation techniques and careful control over the cash flow a business generates.

Michael Zenner - CEO  
         
Eye Spy Spotter Services Inc.
eyespyspotter.com
bartheft.com  (blog)
Hospitality Checkpoint PLLC
Lic. 1597616
hospitalitycheckpoint.com
liquorassessment.com
PO BOX 995 Gilbert AZ 85299
Office: 480-777-7056
Mobile: 602-622-0875
Toll Free: 800-880-0811

Lobby Bar

1. Bartender 1:  Male, 5’8”, xxxxxxxxx, in his forties, with a medium build and short, brown hair.  He wore a tee shirt.

1. Bartender 2:  Female, 5’3”, xxxxxxx, in her twenties or early thirties, with a medium build and long, dark hair.  She wore xxxxxxx and a black hooded sweatshirt.

1. Bartender 3:  Male, 5’4”, xxxxxxxx, with an average build and a dark xxxxxxx. 

1. Bartender 4:  Male, 6’2”, xxxxxxxx, in his thirties, with an average build and long, wavy blond hair.  He wore a baggy hooded sweatshirt and a knit cap.

1. Bartender 5:  xxxxxxxx, 5’5”, xxxxxxxxx, in her twenties, with a medium build and short, dark hair.  She wore a black xxxxxxx.

Barback:  Male, 5’8”, xxxxxxxxxx with a slender build and dark, curly hair.  He wore jeans and a hooded sweatshirt.  He had a slight xxxxxx and xxxxxxxx.

Bartender 1 was friendly when the agent approached the bar.  He did not offer upsell options or ask for a liquor preference.  He filled the round promptly and asked if the agent wanted to start a tab when the agent presented a credit card. 

Bartender 1 accepted the card and appeared to begin the tab properly.

When the agent approached the bar again, Bartender 5 gave him a pleasant greeting.  She also did not offer upsell options or ask for a liquor preference.  She gave a verbal total for the round, then located the agent’s tab and recorded the items.

The bartenders demonstrated proper free-pour technique, delivering 1 ¼-ounce single-liquor drinks and shots.  Their pours were consistent.

The bartenders occasionally asked for identification when patrons presented credit cards.

The bartenders worked quickly and were generally pleasant but not friendly.  They initially were diligent about ensuring guests had wristbands before serving them.  However, their attention to upholding liquor laws was meager.  When two patrons attempted to order a total of six shots, Bartender 5 explained she could serve them two shots, but they would have to walk away from the bar and approach again for the next two.  However, after several exchanges with the patrons, Bartender 5 served them four shots.  The patrons then turned around and delivered two of the shots to female guests that accompanied them—the guests did not have wristbands and were clearly not of legal drinking age.  Bartender 5 was looking straight at the group during this time but did not acknowledge the transgression.  This occurred at 7:38pm.

TITLE 4, CHAPTER 3

4-241. Selling or giving liquor to underage person; illegally obtaining liquor by underage person; violation; classification

A. A licensee, an employee or any other person who questions or has reason to question whether or not a person ordering, purchasing, attempting to purchase or otherwise procuring or attempting to procure the serving or delivery of spirituous liquor is under the legal drinking age shall require the person to exhibit a written instrument of identification and may require the person on a card to be retained by the licensee to sign the person's name, the date, and the number of such identification. An off-sale retail licensee or employee of an off-sale retail licensee shall require an instrument of identification from any customer who appears to be under twenty-seven years of age and who is using a drive-through or other physical feature of the licensed premises that allows a customer to purchase spirituous liquor without leaving the customer's vehicle. The following written instruments are the only acceptable types of identification: 

TITLE 4, CHAPTER 3

4-244. Unlawful acts

23. For an on-sale retailer or employee to conduct drinking contests, to sell or deliver to a person an unlimited number of spirituous liquor beverages during any set period of time for a fixed price, to deliver more than thirty-two ounces of beer, one liter of wine or four ounces of distilled spirits in any spirituous liquor drink to one person at one time for that person's consumption or to advertise any practice prohibited by this paragraph.

The general practice of the bartenders was to ring in items immediately after they were served; there did not appear to be a protocol that only tab transactions were recorded on the computers.  However, Bartender 4 worked the left side of the bar, where a loose cash drawer was placed atop the back bar.  Bartender 4 rang in items on the screen many times, but he also frequently simply made change from the cash drawer without ever touching the computer screen. This was a red flag for the Agent to observe and an apparent integrity issue.  It quickly became clear that Bartender 4 had other integrity issues, as well:

• At 7:20pm, he served a draft beer and two Coors Light bottles and accepted cash without ringing in anything.

• At 7:25pm, he placed cash accepted for a draft beer directly into the tip bucket.

• At 7:48pm, Bartender 4 accepted cash for a round and did not ring it in.

• At 8:32pm, Bartender 4 accepted cash for a round and did not ring it in.  Shortly thereafter, he showed special interest in a female patron and prepared her drink with two full ounces of alcohol.

At 8:36pm, Bartender 4 did not ring in an order of draft beer.

Other bartenders were not without transgressions:

Bartenders 1 and 5 frequently left the drawer to the right cash register open through multiple transactions.

• At 7:55pm, Bartender 5 hit “No Sale” to open the register and extracted what appeared to be two tens and one five-dollar bill, all of which she placed in the tip bucket.

• At 9:04pm, Bartender 5 slipped cash that was sitting on top of the right register into the tip bucket.

Barback appeared behind the bar and collected tip buckets.  He took the buckets to the rear right corner of the bar and changed out tips.  The agent strongly discourages allowing this, as it functions as an easy method by which to extract laundered stolen funds. 

Barback drank from a cup with no lid while behind the bar.

When the agent requested his tab, Bartender 5 provided two credit card receipts, with no itemization.  She did not request identification for his card, as it instructs.

Bartender 5 thanked the agent before he departed.

The agent observed the remainder of the bars from afar.  He did not view any suspicious activities or evidence of theft.

Outside Bar

• Bartender X:  Female, 5’4”, Caucasian, in her twenties, with an average build and dark hair.

Bartender X appeared very friendly and chatted throughout the visit with guests.  She utilized proper pour technique and appeared to charge appropriately for all items.

Inside Bar, left of stage

• Bartender A:  Male, 5’11”, XXXXXx, in his twenties, with a slender build and with multiple tattoos.  He wore a tight maroon polo shirt.
• Bartender B:  Male, 5’7”, XXXXXXXX, in his twenties, with a muscular build.  He wore a neon green hat.

Bartenders A and B appeared friendly and to work well with one another.  Bartender B periodically left the bar and visited staff behind the lobby bar.  He appeared to help out in a barback capacity.

Bartender A requested identification from guests.  The agent could not determine whether said guests wore wristbands.

Side Bar

• Bartender Y:  Male, 5’10”, XXXXXXXXx, in his twenties, with a medium build, a bald head, and a short beard and mustache.  He wore a red scarf.

Bartender Y also appeared friendly.  He worked quickly and appeared personable and to have a good attitude.  He did not have a register in which to ring in items; cash from all transactions went into his cash drawer.

Bartender Y was occasionally seen in the lobby; the agent could not establish whether someone was watching his bar in his absence.

At 9:04pm, Bartender 5 slipped cash that was sitting on top of the right register into the tip bucket. 

Barback appeared behind the bar and collected tip buckets.  He took the buckets to the rear right corner of the bar and changed out tips.  The agent strongly discourages allowing this, as it functions as an easy method by which to extract laundered stolen funds.

Barback drank from a cup with no lid while behind the bar.

When the agent requested his tab, Bartender 5 provided two credit card receipts, with no itemization.  She did not request identification for his card, as it instructs.

Bartender 5 thanked the agent before he departed.

The agent observed the remainder of the bars from afar.  He did not view any suspicious activities or evidence of theft.

Outside Bar

Bartender X:  Female, 5’4”, Caucasian, in her twenties, with an average build and dark hair.

Bartender X appeared very friendly and chatted throughout the visit with guests.  She utilized proper pour technique and appeared to charge appropriately for all items.

Inside Bar, left of stage

• Bartender A:  Male, 5’11”, Caucasian, in his twenties, with a slender build and with multiple tattoos.  He wore a tight maroon polo shirt.
• Bartender B:  Male, 5’7”, Caucasian, in his twenties, with a muscular build.  He wore a neon green hat.

Bartenders A and B appeared friendly and to work well with one another.  Bartender B periodically left the bar and visited staff behind the lobby bar.  He appeared to help out in a barback capacity.

Bartender A requested identification from guests.  The agent could not determine whether said guests wore wristbands.

Side Bar

Bartender Y:  Male, 5’10”, Caucasian, in his twenties, with a medium build, a bald head, and a short beard and mustache.  He wore a red scarf.

Bartender Y also appeared friendly.  He worked quickly and appeared personable and to have a good attitude.  He did not have a register in which to ring in items; cash from all transactions went into his cash drawer.

Bartender Y was occasionally seen in the lobby; the agent could not establish whether someone was watching his bar in his absence.

Michael Zenner - CEO  
         
Eye Spy Spotter Services Inc.
eyespyspotter.com
bartheft.com  (blog)
Hospitality Checkpoint PLLC
Lic. 1597616
hospitalitycheckpoint.com
liquorassessment.com
PO BOX 995 Gilbert AZ 85299
Office: 480-777-7056
Mobile: 602-622-0875
Toll Free: 800-880-0811

1. Bartender 1:  Female, 5’5”, Caucasian, in her early twenties, with a medium build and dark hair worn in pigtails.  She wore black pants, a black tee shirt with an establishment advertisement on it, and no nametag.
2. Bartender 2:  Female, 5’4”, Caucasian, in her early twenties, with an average build and long, straight blond hair with bangs.  She also wore black pants and a black promotional tee shirt, as well as a nametag identifying her as Xxxxxx.

Bartender 1 approached the agent and his associate very soon after they approached the bar.  She immediately placed beverage napkins on the bar top and offered drinks. 

She did not suggest upsell options, but did mention the feature drink for the month.

Bartender 1 did not require identification.  Both the agent and his associate appear less than forty years of age, and the agent is frequently assumed less than thirty.

Bartender 1 filled and delivered the round promptly.  She did not ask for payment or to secure a tab, but did ring in the round promptly.

Several minutes later, Bartender 1 returned and offered menus.  She mentioned the nightly food special and informed the agent and his associate of a drink special that would be offered later in the night.

Bartender 1 returned in appropriate time to take the agent’s order.  She offered no upsell options, nor did she suggest any additional items.  She promptly rang in the order and provided a paper basket with napkins and silverware rolls.

Throughout the visit, prior to the allotted time of the drink special, Bartender 1 frequently advised patrons both seated at the bar as well as walking-up of the drink specials later in the night.

Xxxxxx delivered the appetizer in appropriate time.  Two minutes later, a food runner delivered the entrees.

Bartender 1 checked on the agent and his associate after several minutes.  She continued to check on them several times throughout the meal, and removed their service items when it was appropriate.  She offered carry-out boxes and did not suggest dessert.

Both bartenders offered additional rounds at the appropriate times; however, Bartender 1 showed the agent and his associate far more attention and pleasantness than did Xxxxxx.  When Xxxxxx did pass by and interact with the agent and his associate, she did so with a blank expression or a scowl.  She did not smile nor did she appear friendly.

Both bartenders typically utilized proper free-pour technique, delivering the requisite 1 ¼-ounce single-liquor shot.  Excessive pours appeared a result of a lack of attention, rather than intentional.

The bartenders showed no habit of immediately moving to the register to ring in rounds, particularly when the guest volume increased.  When business was slower, they moseyed to the register and lazily input rounds after they were served. 

It is during busier times, however, when the practice of immediately rings is particularly important, as a bartender can easily forget rounds when grouping.  Additionally, in the agent’s experience, bartenders with a penchant for theft always make sure to ring in rounds immediately when business is slow, because any omission would be conspicuous.  Thinking that heavier business masks their transgressions, instead, it shows the agent their true colors.

• At 7:53pm, Bartender 1 prepared a White Russian using Three Olives Root Beer vodka for a patron; she did not ring in the item.
• At 8:11pm, Bartender 1 served a round of beers to three male patrons sitting at the right end of the bar; said patrons appeared of questionable drinking age, and to be regular guests.  Bartender 1 did not ring in the round.
• At 9:20pm, Bartender 1 prepared a clear vodka drink for a male patron at the left end of the bar.  She delivered the drink with no straw and did not ring it in.

Bartender 1 occasionally scooped ice using glassware—a dangerous practice that is a liability issue for the establishment, as well as an AZ health code violation. .

Both bartenders drank from cups with lids when behind the bar.  They typically did so while standing at the far right side of the bar, halfway obscured by a partial wall.  They did not eat when behind the bar, or utilize cell phone or any personal items.

The bartenders allowed a server wearing the nametag Emily to prepare several drinks behind the bar.

When the agent and his associate requested their tab, Xxxxxx accepted their card with neither a word nor a smile.  She immediately processed the payment and neither required identification—as instructed by the agent’s card—nor provided an itemized receipt.  She also returned the tab without a word.

Bartender 1 called goodbye to the agent and his associate when they departed, wishing them a good night.

The agent and his associate found Bartender 1 pleasant, but Xxxxxx rude.  She was perfectly willing to lean on the bar top, chatting lazily with guests who were regulars, but she could not be bothered to offer so much as a smile to guests she did not know.

Michael Zenner - CEO  
         
Eye Spy Spotter Services Inc.
eyespyspotter.com
bartheft.com  (blog)
Hospitality Checkpoint PLLC
Lic. 1597616
hospitalitycheckpoint.com
liquorassessment.com
PO BOX 995 Gilbert AZ 85299
Office: 480-777-7056
Mobile: 602-622-0875
Toll Free: 800-880-0811

• Bartender:  Female, 5’3”, Caucasian, in her twenties, with an average build and curly, blond hair.

Bartender approached the agent several minutes after he was seated at the bar.  She offered a smile and to get him something to drink.

Bartender required identification before filling the round.  She delivered the round atop cocktail napkins, and immediately moved to the register, appearing to ring in the round.

She did not ask the agent for a credit card or place a printed tab in front of him.  She also did not suggest a menu or food.

Bartender was pleasant but not distinctly friendly.  She offered additional rounds at the appropriate times and always used cocktail napkins.  She appeared to always ring in items after they were served.  

However, she did not place printed tabs in front of guests and did not give any receipts; therefore, the agent was unable to validate most transactions. 

The agent did not have line-of-sight of deposit of any cash tips.  The cash-handling he was able to observe seemed appropriate.
Bartender followed proper pour technique and service bar procedures. 

When the agent presented payment, Bartender picked it up without a word.  She again appeared to ring in the round, as she returned to his place setting to verify what he had had to drink.  The agent found this odd, as he had thought she rang in the round immediately after serving it.  However, since the register screen faces the back bar and is not visible from across the bar, it was possible Bartender mimicked ringing in the round the first time, with the intent of later pocketing a cash sale.  Please refer to the Food and Beverage Summary for further evidence of this intent.

Bartender returned the agent’s processed payment, with an itemized receipt, in a check presenter.  She did not thank him or address him, or even smile.  She simply walked away.

Bartender Addendum:

DO NOT POST THIS SECTION TO STAFF
SPOTTER ANONYMITY WILL BE COMPROMISED

When the agent stated he was moving to a table, Bartender did not offer to transfer his tab.  Rather, she gave a look of annoyance when he presented a credit card and immediately closed out his tab.  Again, she appeared to ring in the round at that time, making the agent suspect a fake ring at the time of service.  This suspicion was corroborated by the itemized receipt he received: its time stamp was 5:58pm, and that of his credit card slip, 5:59pm.

The agent believes, had he paid cash, the round would not have been rung. Agent suspects integrity/theft issues with this bartender and would recommend immediate follow up.

Michael Zenner - CEO  
         
Eye Spy Spotter Services Inc.
eyespyspotter.com
bartheft.com  (blog)
Hospitality Checkpoint PLLC
Lic. 1597616
hospitalitycheckpoint.com
liquorassessment.com
PO BOX 995 Gilbert AZ 85299
Office: 480-777-7056
Mobile: 602-622-0875
Toll Free: 800-880-0811

• Bartender 1: Female, approximately 5’7” tall with dark long hair pulled up, dressed in a black logo’d shirt and black pants.  The Agent overheard a guest call her Xxxx.
• Bartender 2:  Male, approximately 5’10” tall with brown hair and glasses dressed in a black logo’d shirt.  The Agent knows this Bartender as Xxxx from previous visits when he has introduced himself.

When the agent first arrived there were no seats available at the bar, surprisingly despite the time of day.  The Agent took a seat at a tall bar table, and sat there for approximately 4 minutes until greeted or acknowledged by a staff member.  A male server eventually greeted the Agent and introduced himself as Xxxx.  A seat at the bar opened up and the Agent moved to the bar.  The Agent was quickly greeted by Xxxx who offered the Agent a beverage.  Xxxx upsold the Agent and delivered the beverage quickly and a menu was offered.

Xxxx and Xxxx both appeared to have great rapport with the regular guests seated at the Bar.  No dupes were seen in the rail in front of any guests.  It appeared to the Agent that a shift change was occurring as Xxxx was counting cash behind the bar next to the POS.  It was difficult to see but cash was very visible and it appeared that Xxxx was making a new bank and balancing the drawer.  The Agent would recommend that this be done by a Manager or at least have the Bartender count the drawer and the Manager run the report.  If a Bartender is building the drawer the entire night, this is an easy way for theft to occur if they are allowed to run report and balance cash.  It may be better that cash is counted in the office as well and not out in front of customers.

The Agent watched as many alcoholic beverages were made.  Most guests were consuming beer at the bar however, Xxxx was observed mostly pouring a solid 4 count, however, some 5 counts were observed.  Xxxx was serving mainly the guests at the Bar.  Very rarely was there movement to the POS to ring in beverages served.  There was several times where the Agent observed grouping of drinks being rung.  The Agent observed as Xxxx also poured from the wine bottle directly into a female customers wine glass versus a controlled pour into the carafe.  At 4:40 and 5:00, the Agent observed male server Xxxx behind bar getting own drinks.  This is a huge concern of theft as it is hard to control when servers are allowed to get their own beverages. 

The service from both bartenders was very good.  It is obvious that the regular guests come there for the comradarie but also the service.  The Agent would caution the owner, that all drinks should be recorded immediately after service…even the best Bartender will not remember how many drinks each guest consumed in any given night.

The back bar was noted to be clean and organized.  Some dirty glassware built up at the end of the bar but otherwise very clean.

Xxxx offered to transfer the Agent’s tab into the dining room therefore a check was never presented.  All items were correctly transferred to the check.

Both Bartenders were nicely dressed and groomed.  Both have great personalities and are very service oriented. 

Even though it’s the Holidays, and the gift of giving is prominent, if Bartenders are allowed to give away drinks, it should still be rung into the POS on a house check for accountability.  The Agent would assume that many beverages were not accurately charged for on this night.

Michael Zenner - CEO  
         
Eye Spy Spotter Services Inc.
eyespyspotter.com
bartheft.com  (blog)
Hospitality Checkpoint PLLC
Lic. 1597616
hospitalitycheckpoint.com
liquorassessment.com
PO BOX 995 Gilbert AZ 85299
Office: 480-777-7056
Mobile: 602-622-0875
Toll Free: 800-880-0811

Most bartenders are basically honest. Unfortunately, some are not. Of all the workers in the hospitality industry, the bartender has the best opportunities for stealing.

Consider that the bartender alone is generally responsible for taking a drink order, preparing it, serving it, collecting income, recording it on the register or data machine, and making change. In some operations, especially small ones, he or she is also responsible for ordering products, conducting inventories, and reconciling cash when the shift ends.

A basic principle of sales income control is to reduce the opportunities for theft available to one employee working alone. However, it is very difficult to do so in the case of a bartender, because his or her duties cannot conveniently be divided with another worker. If that could be done, it would make it more difficult for the bartender to steal because collusion between two or more employees is usually required.

Control of bartender theft begins during the job interview. While it's easy to say "hire honest people," in practice, it's hard to do so objectively.

Checking applicant references, utilizing the services of a bonding company, and placing a bartender in a tightly controlled operation are several techniques that are at the beginning of the bartender control strategy.

It is not easy to determine the honesty of a bartender or any other employee in an objective way. Still, many managers pride themselves on being able to select an honest staff. The realization that it is difficult to do so is a good justification for a detailed study of ways to control bartender theft.

A number of standard operating procedures can be utilized for controlling theft of this kind. First, you can use a system to anticipate the amount of income that should be collected. The use of guest checks, electronic data machines, pre-check registers, and so on are examples of ways to provide a "double-check" on the amount of sales income rung on the register. Second, you can closely supervise the bartender when he or she is working. Third, you can use a shopping service, which will help assess the extent to which bartenders comply with required operating procedures. Finally, you can develop detailed procedures for the use of registers and data machines. Bartenders should know that they are not allowed to bunch sales, work out of an open cash drawer, and leave the tip jar close to the register.

One tactic many operators use for controlling bartender theft involves replacing the cash drawer during the work shift itself. The manager rings the machine to assess the amount of sales generated since the beginning of the bartender's shift. The cash drawer is pulled and replaced with another cash drawer. The money in the cash drawer should be counted.

The sum of all sales rung up plus the beginning cash bank should, of course, equal the amount of cash in the drawer. If there is more cash in the drawer than is expected, the manager has a clue that the bartender has been "no-ringing," that is he or she has been giving away drinks, depositing money without registering the sale on the machine, or keeping track of the amount of cash that can be withdrawn at the end of the shift or some other convenient time.

The wise manager knows the standard beverage cost and routinely compares the expected costs with the actual costs. If the difference exceeds a pre-established variance, that is an objective indication that "something is wrong." The theft of sales income -- which increase the beverage cost percent -- is a common reason for excessive variances.

The beverage manager will do well to ask himself this question: "If I were a dishonest bartender, how would I steal from the operation?"

To the extent that answers to that question can be developed, the manager is aware of potential problems that must be corrected. Unfortunately, though, the street-wise bartender is often aware of many more ways to steal than the manager has any inkling of. At the least, however, the manager must accept the responsibility of making the sales income control system as tight as possible without losing sensitivity to the need for efficiency at the time of guest service.

Some managers use a wide variety of procedures to reduce opportunities for theft. For example, they might mark house bottles to make it more difficult for dishonest bartenders to bring in their own beverage stocks, or they could rotate the shifts of bartenders and beverage servers.

Hiring inexperienced bartenders, who presumably do not know a wide range of theft methods, is a third example. At least one property has fired a dishonest bartender and then rehired him as a special consultant to demonstrate common theft methods that he and his colleagues have used to beat the house. A common denominator in all of these management strategies is the need to make routine comparisons between the potential and actual costs and take corrective action as necessary.

Close supervision has already been noted as a major deterrent to bartender theft. Managers should recognize that there is no automatic correlation between length of employment and the honesty of the staff member. Frequently, long-tenured bartenders are given more freedom than those newly hired and are not required to follow all operating procedures.

It is that kind of situation that enables the dishonest bartender -- regardless of length of employment -- to steal. Therefore, it is important that tight procedures be developed and implemented and that all employees, regardless of length of service, be required to comply with them.

If you understand that it is extremely difficult to prevent bartender theft, you will recognize the importance of implementing basic, common-sense strategies to reduce the impact of the problem on your bottom line. Likewise, you will take another step in your progress toward reducing bartender theft if you are aware that your employees as well as the people down the street are likely to steal. Once the manager recognizes that he is susceptible to theft and that control procedures must be developed and implemented to combat the problem, he has taken the first step.

A commitment to reducing the chances of bartender theft can be converted into action plans to revise operating procedures as necessary to "tighten" sales income control practices.

In contrast, those who are unaware of the significance of the problem will probably not take any steps to fight it. As a result, the facility's economic objectives can never be maximized.

by Herman E. Zaddareli 

Michael Zenner - CEO  
         
Eye Spy Spotter Services Inc.
eyespyspotter.com
bartheft.com  (blog)
Hospitality Checkpoint PLLC
Lic. 1597616
hospitalitycheckpoint.com
liquorassessment.com
PO BOX 995 Gilbert AZ 85299
Office: 480-777-7056
Mobile: 602-622-0875
Toll Free: 800-880-0811

Michael Zenner - CEO  
         
Eye Spy Spotter Services Inc.
eyespyspotter.com
bartheft.com  (blog)
Hospitality Checkpoint PLLC
Lic. 1597616
hospitalitycheckpoint.com
liquorassessment.com
PO BOX 995 Gilbert AZ 85299
Office: 480-777-7056
Mobile: 602-622-0875
Toll Free: 800-880-0811